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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PRATTS CAN RELY ON ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT NOT 
CHALLENGED BY MR. MARKS' AFFIDAVIT. 
The argument of Mary Ann Nichols 1 and her attorneys (hereafter Defendants), that 
the Pratts cannot rely on the allegations of their pleading to support their Statement of 
Facts, is without merit. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) (stating when a motion for summary 
judgment is supported by affidavit, an adverse party must produce evidence to show a 
dispute of fact) applies only to affidavits that controvert a pleading. A party opposing 
summary judgment can rely on the allegations of his pleading where those allegations are 
not controverted by matters outside the pleadings. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998). The rule is plainly stated in Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App. 
86^24, 67 P.3d 1042: 2 
[A]n affidavit supporting a summary judgment motion, proffering evidence 
in contradiction of only some of the opposing party's allegations, does not 
trigger a requirement that the opposing party proffer evidence supporting 
those allegations that remain unchallenged. 
The Pratts are entitled to rely on Walter v. Stewart, and rely on the allegations of 
their pleadings as to matters not controverted by matters outside the pleadings. 
1
 Mary Ann's maiden surname was apparently Kingston. Mary Ann is married; the 
Pratts have learned her married surname is Nichols. 
2
 This is a point on which the Court could do a service to the public, bar, and trial 
courts, and perhaps avoid future litigation and waste of judicial resources. It is common for 
a Rule 12( b)(6) motion to raise several issues, only one of which is affected by matters 
presented outside the pleadings. The Court may wish to consider clarifying whether the 
effect is merely as stated in Walter v. Stewart supra, or whether a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
supported by matters outside the pleadings actually is converted to a Rule 56 motion only 
as to issues affected by those extraneous matters, and remains a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to 
issues not affected by matters outside the pleadings. 
1 
Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debrv, 2001 UT App. 397, 38 P.3d 984, does not 
support Defendants' argument. Campbell stated that "once the proponent of summary 
judgment establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opponent to provide some 
evidence in opposition to the motion," Id. at f^ 18. "A prima facie case has been made 
when evidence has been received ••• that, in the absence of contrary evidence, would 
entitle the party having the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at/h 6 
(citation omitted). In other words, Campbell says a party opposing summary judgment has 
no burden to provide evidence on an issue until the moving party establishes a prima facie 
case as to that issue. That is the same rule stated in Walter, supra. In this action, the only 
matter outside the pleadings was an Affidavit of William Mark, describing the defendants' 
press conference. Mr. Mark's affidavit did not challenge the allegations of the Pratts' 
pleading upon which they rely to support their Statement of Facts. Under Campbell, Mr. 
Mack's affidavit did not establish a prima facie case shifting the burden to the Pratts to 
produce evidence to support their Statement of Facts. Therefore, the Pratts can rely on 
the unchallenged allegations of their pleading. 
II. THE JUDICIAL PUBLICATION PRIVILEGE ISSUE IS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Under Utah R. App. Proc. 46, certiorari is a matter of judicial discretion, to be 
granted for "special and important reasons." This matter is before the Supreme Court 
pursuant to its Order granting the Pratts' Petition for Certiorari, in which this Court has 
already ordered it would hear the issues described in its Order. Implicit in the Court's 
Order granting certiorari was its finding, after being informed by the parties' briefs in 
support of and in opposition to certiorari, that the requirements of Rule 46 were satisfied. 
Defendants' "preservation of issues" argument is a thinly disguised collateral attack on the 
Court's Order granting certiorari, and should be disregarded for that reason. 
2 
Defendants are also wrong on the merits. The only "error" committed by the Pratts 
was the late filing of their Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Based on Judicial Privilege. That Memorandum was before the trial court six full 
days before Defendants submitted their Motion to Dismiss for decision. 3 The Pratts also 
filed a Motion to Strike Defendants' "Judicial Privilege" Argument, a motion that 
Defendants did not oppose, a full month before the trial court made its decision. It is quite 
common for trial courts to accept late-filed memoranda. It is a reasonable inference, 
which this Court accepts as true for purposes of appeal, that the trial court would not have 
stricken the Pratts' Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Based on Judicial Privilege, except for Defendants' having filed a Motion to Strike the 
Pratts' Reply Memorandum, a motion that the Pratts opposed and that Defendants never 
submitted for decision. All of those motions and memoranda were before the trial court 
before it ruled on any motion. The trial court not only knew of the asserted error, the 
Pratts specifically raised the issue, asked the trial court to reach what the Pratts contend 
is the right result on the merits, and presented to the trial court the legal authority to do 
so. The trial court had before it all the information including controlling legal authority 
necessary for it to avoid the error, the opportunity to avoid it, and the Pratts' request that 
the court avoid it. Based on the above, the Pratts preserved the issue for appeal. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE "INVITED ERROR" RULE. 
In point 1(C) of their Brief of Appellants, the Pratt discussed the case law behind 
the "invited error" doctrine. Attached hereto as Addendum A is a table surveying most 
Utah appellate decisions applying the "invited error" doctrine. The vast majority of cases 
3
 Utah R. Civ. Proc. 7(d) provides, "When briefing is complete, either party may file 
a 'Request to Submit for Decision.' ... If no party files a request, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision." 
3 
involve counsel's conscious decisions during the heat and rush of trial, that affirmatively 
led the trial court to commit otherwise reversible errors in impaneling and instructing 
juries and in admitting or excluding evidence. It should be the rare case indeed where the 
"invited error" doctrine is applied in situations where the trial court has weeks rather than 
minutes to consider before deciding a matter, particularly where the error results from the 
filing of a memorandum that, while late, is filed a week before a motion is submitted for 
decision and a full month before the trial court makes its decision. This is not such a case. 
For these and the additional reasons stated in Point II above, the Pratts did not invite the 
trial court to commit error. 
Even Defendants "agree that a court should not apply the [invited error] doctrine 
where it is not raised by either party ..." [Brief of Appellees p. 15] Defendants argue 
they did raise the issue. However, their Brief of Appellees to the Court of Appeals shows 
"it just ain't so." Defendants only argued that the Pratts waived the "judicial proceeding 
privilege" issue by failing to preserve it for appeal. Failing to preserve an issue, which 
is all that Defendants argued, is a different legal principle than invited error. 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISMISSAL BASED ON THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
PRIVILEGE. 
Defendants simply ignore Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1311/w.7 (Utah 1990), 
which states that "The class of occasions where the publication of defamatory matter is 
absolutely privileged is confined within narrow limits to cases in which the public service 
or the administration of justice requires complete immunity to account for language used." 
Allen relied on DeBryv. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, 992 P.2d 979 and Brehanyv. Nordstrom, 
812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991). 
Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28 1 15, 20 P.3d 895 recognizes an "excessive 
publication" limit on the "judicial proceeding" privilege. Defendants place too much 
4 
reliance on the word "may" in the Krouse statement that "the judicial proceeding privilege 
may be lost due to excessive publication." Defendants want the "excessive publication" 
rule to be, "the judicial proceeding privilege may be, or maybe it won't be, lost due to 
excessive publication." That is no rule at all, it is meaningless gobbledygook. Defendants 
quote but want this Court to ignore the its own more absolute statement: 
Statements that are otherwise privileged lose their privilege if they are 
excessively published, that is, "published to more persons than the scope of 
the privilege requires to effectuate its purpose." ... The excessive 
publication rule, in the context of judicial proceeding privilege cases, is to 
prevent abuse of the privilege by publication of defamatory statements to 
persons who have no connection to the judicial proceeding. Therefore, ... 
the [publication] would be excessively published if it was published to more 
persons than necessary to resolve the dispute or further the objectives of the 
proposed litigation, in other words, if the letter was published to those who 
did not have a legitimate role in resolving the dispute, or if it was published 
to persons who did not have an adequate legal interest in the outcome of the 
proposed litigation. 
Id. Defendants' reliance on the Krouse Court's paraphrase of Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 
P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) is even less tenable, as Brehany actually stated, "The plaintiff can 
show abuse of the privilege by proving ... that the publication of the defamatory material 
extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving it." 4 According 
to this very Court, the judicial proceeding privilege (a) does not protect publications that 
go beyond those "in which the public service or the administration of justice requires 
complete immunity," Allen; (b) does not protect publications made to "more persons than 
necessary to resolve the dispute or further the objectives of the proposed litigation," 
Krouse; (c) does not protect publications "to more persons than the scope of the privilege 
requires to effectuate its purpose," DeBry; and (d) does not protect publication to persons 
"beyond those who ha[vej a legally justified reason for receiving it," Brehany. 
4
 Brehany dealt with a different, qualified privilege, but this Court found its reasoning 
applicable to the judicial proceeding privilege. 
5 
Defendants' statement that the Pratts did not "seriously challenge" of the elements 
of the privilege recognized in Krouse is without merit. The Pratts devoted eight pages of 
argument in their Brief of Appellants to the Court of Appeals on that point. For example, 
the Pratts cited Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), which held that an 
attorney's publications at a press conference about a pending judicial proceeding are not 
made "during the course of judicial proceedings" and are not within a judicial proceeding 
privilege. The Pratts also cited two respected treatises, Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton 
on Torts § 114, 820 (5th ed 1984) and Prosser, Law of Torts § 114 (4th ed. 1971) for the 
generally recognized principal that an attorney's publications to the press and media are 
not publications "during the course of judicial proceedings" and are not privileged. 
Defendants argue the news media has "a connection to the case" in that the media 
is involved in publishing stories that are newsworthy, and that Mary Ann's case was 
newsworthy. 5 Defendants cite no supporting authority because there is none. The scope 
of a privilege is not determined by whether a story is newsworthy. An attorney's 
statement is "privileged by the occasion on which it is spoken," and is not privileged if 
made to "any person other than those to whom, or in any place other than that in which, 
such publication is required or authorized by law to be made for the proper conduct of the 
judicial proceedings." Buckely at 277 and/h 8. A newsworthy story does not make the 
press necessary to resolve a lawsuit. A newsworthy story does not make an attorney's 
active participation in spreading lies to the press privileged. The privilege does not apply 
to publications made to persons, including the news media, who are not necessary to 
resolve the dispute, or who lack a legal interest in the outcome of the litigation. Krouse 
at f 15. No matter how newsworthy a story, the news media are not necessary to resolve 
s
 Defendants' argument is largely relies on "facts" that have no record support, an on 
inferences construed against the Pratts, rather than for them as the standard on appeal 
requires. 
6 
private lawsuits and have no legal interest in the outcome of private lawsuits. Defendants' 
argument that their publications were privileged because they were newsworthy is not only 
unsupported by any legal authority, it is directly contrary to the controlling law. 
Defendants cite no evidence for their contention they decided to hold a press 
conference "to minimize the potential for media representatives making inquires of Mary 
Ann." Given the posture of this case, this Court construes all facts and reasonable 
inferences in favor of the Pratts. Mary Ann's Complaint was filed on August 1, 2003. 
Defendants held their press conference on August 28, 2003. There is no evidence any 
member of the media learned of the lawsuit during those four weeks, the most likely time 
for discovering it on their own. There is no evidence any member of the public ever 
obtained a copy of the Complaint other than from Defendants at the press conference. It 
is reasonable to infer that but for Defendants' acts the news media would not have 
discovered Mary Ann's Complaint, and that there would have been no publication of any 
statement by Defendants outside of court. 
Defendants' "what might have been" games is irrelevant in any event. If a man is 
drawing his last breath on his deathbed, and someone walks up and puts a bullet in his 
head, it is still murder. It is no defense that the man would have died anyway. 
A private citizen making a privileged court document publicly available commits 
a re-publication outside the judicial arena, and is outside the pale of the judicial publication 
privilege. Defendants cite no evidence that the Utah Trial Lawyers Association maintains 
a "brief bank," yet alone any evidence as to the contents of any document that might be 
found therein. Whoever may maintain a "brief bank"for sharing its content with others 
would do so outside the protection of the judicial protection privilege and publishes at his 
own risk. 
Defendants ask this Court to ignore its own controlling cases of Allen, Krouse, 
DeBry, and Brehany and ignore the U.S. Supreme Court case of Buckley, and instead 
7 
apply a narrow line of Texas lower appellate court cases, whose rationale is roundly 
chastised by this Court's own cases. Even the Texas appellate court Defendants rely on 
is split, with an entire line of authority in full agreement with this Court's prior decisions. 
See Levingston Shipbuilding Co. v. Inland West Corp., 688 S.W.2d 192, 196-97 (Tex. 
App. 1985) (a defendant by filing a lawsuit, then having have his petition delivered to the 
media, "stepped out of the umbrella of privilege"); Pisharodi v. Barrash, 116 S.W.3d 
858, 864 (Tex. App. 2003) ("Although libelous statements made in connection to a judicial 
proceeding are absolutely privileged, re-publication of such statements outside of the 
judicial context waives the privilege."). Levingston and Pisharodi both cited De 
Mankowski v. Ship Channel Development Co., 300 S.W. 118, 122 (Tex. App. 1927), 
which rested on language similar to Utah's "excessive publication" 
The privilege accorded a litigant which exempts him from liability for 
damages caused by false charges made in his pleadings, or in the court in the 
course of a judicial proceeding, cannot be enlarged into a license to go about 
in the community and make false and slanderous charges against his court 
adversary and escape liability for damages caused by such charges on the 
ground that he had made similar charges in his court pleadings. 
See also Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 73 (Pa. 2004) (judicial privilege did not apply 
to an attorney sending a complaint to a reporter); Ricciardi v. Weber, 795 A.2d 914, 925 
(N.J. Super. 2002) (an attorney's distribution of pleadings to the press is not immunized 
as part of any judicial process); White & Johnson, P.C. v. Bayne, 670 N.W.2d 430, 2003 
WL 21696938 (Iowa App. 2003) ("While a defamatory pleading is privileged, that 
pleading cannot be a basis for dissemination of defamatory statements to the public or third 
parties not connected with the judicial proceeding."); Abbott v. United Venture Capital, 
Inc., 718 F.Supp. 823, 828 (D. Nev.1988) (a lawyer's letter to the press announcing a 
lawsuit, and including a copy of the Complaint, were not privileged). 
8 
Based on the above, neither Defendants' republication of Mary Ann's Complaint 
at the press conference, nor any other statements or publications made by Defendants at 
the press conference, were protected by a judicial privilege. 
V. DEFENDANTS9 PUBLICATIONS WERE NOT PROTECTED BY A 
"GROUP DEFAMATION" RULE. 
Defendants' contention that none of their publications referred to or concerned the 
Pratts is without merit. Defendants' first act of defamation was the republication of copies 
of Mary Ann's Complaint to the press conference attendees. That act was an extra-judicial 
republication by Defendants to the media of the following written statements: 
1. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, included in the 
Complaint's definition of "Order Members," planned, assisted, encouraged, 
allowed, aided and abetted in, or otherwise knew of, and in violation of a legal duty 
to do so, failed to act to prevent or to report to authorities a polygamous and 
incestuous marriage between Mary Ann and David Kingston. 
2. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, defined as two of "Order 
Members," knew David Kingston would perpetrate acts of sexual abuse against 
Mary Ann and did nothing to stop it despite a legal duty. 
3. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order 
Members," encouraged, allowed, participated in, failed to report, or otherwise 
assisted David Kingston to commit four separate acts of sexual abuse of Mary Ann. 
4. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order 
Members," encouraged, allowed, participated in, failed to report, or otherwise 
assisted Daniel Kingston to whip Mary Ann and to beat her face and arms. 
9 
5. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order 
Members," intended to cause Mary Ann emotional distress. 
6. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order 
Members," acted with the purpose of causing, or in reckless disregard of the 
likelihood of causing, emotional distress to Mary Ann. 
7. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order 
Members," knew or should have realized they had engaged in conduct that involved 
an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress to Mary Ann. 
8. Defendants published a written statement that from facts known to the Pratts, as two 
of the "Order Members," they should have realized if they caused Mary Ann 
emotional distress it might cause her illness or bodily harm. 
9. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order 
Members," caused Mary Ann emotional distress resulting in illness or bodily harm. 
10. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts were general partners with 
Mary Ann's uncle, and that Mary Ann was forced into an illegal, incestuous, 
marriage with her uncle, and that her uncle committed four separate acts of sexual 
abuse of Mary Ann, all in the ordinary course of the business of the alleged 
partnership, or with the Pratts' authority, knowledge, consent, or ratification as the 
uncle's business partners. 
11. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts were general partners with 
Mary Ann's father, and that her father heat her in the ordinary course of the 
business of the alleged partnership, or with the Pratts' authority, knowledge, 
consent, or ratification as the father's business partners. 
12. Defendants published a written statement that David and Daniel Kingston were the 
Pratt's agents, and that the acts of David and Daniel Kingston as stated above were 
of the general kind and nature that the Pratts had hired, directed, encouraged, 
10 
consented, engaged, or ratified them to perform, and that the acts of David and 
Daniel Kingston occurred within the ordinary scope and boundaries of their 
employment, direction, encouragement, consent, engagement, or ratification, and 
were motivated by the purpose of serving the Pratts's interests. 
14. Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, defined as two of the 
"Order Members," caused Mary Ann at least $10 million in actual damages, under 
circumstances justifying a $100 million punitive damages award against the Pratts. 
The "group defamation" rule does not apply where a person is identified by name, 
even if he is one of others also identified by name. Mary Ann's Complaint, distributed by 
Defendants at their press conference, singles out specific individual defendants including 
the Pratts from a larger group of unnamed persons. A carefully compiled list that singles 
out specific named individuals from a larger group does not identify some faceless 
"group," it identifies the individuals. Such a publication is not a "group defamation" at 
all - it is specific defamations of specific individuals, whether three or three hundred. 
The Mary Ann Complaint clearly refer to and concern the Pratts as individuals. If they 
did not, that Complaint would not state claims upon which relief can be granted against the 
Pratts as individuals, and for that reason would be subject to dismissal under Utah R. Civ. 
Proc. 12(b)(6). The statements in Mary Ann's Complaint specifically identify the Pratts 
by name, and so refer to and concern them. 
Defendants' verbal publications to the news media at their press conference were 
made in the context of the attendees having copies of the Mary Ann Complaint in hand at 
that time Defendants made their verbal publications. See Cuthbert v. National 
Organization for Women, 615 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (N.Y. A.D. 1994), in which the fact 
that publications at a press conference did not identify a plaintiff by name did not preclude 
his defamation suit; he only had to show that the press could ascertain his identity through 
11 
the records of a pending lawsuit. It is reasonable to infer that the news media understood 
Defendants' verbal publications referred to and concerned the individuals identified by 
name in Mary Ann's Complaint, including the Pratts. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts §564A(a) does not follow the controlling Utah 
law of Lynch v. Standard Pub. Co., 170 P. 770 (Utah 1918), Fenstermaker v. Tribune 
Pub. Co., 45 P. 1097 (Utah 1896) (Fenstermaker II), and Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. 
Co., 43 P. 112 (Utah Terr. 1895) (Fenstermaker I), discussed in the Brief of Appellants. 
But even under the Restatement, its subpart (b) would govern this motion: "One who 
publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or class of persons is subject to liability 
to an individual member of it if ... the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise 
to the conclusion that there is particular reference to the member." The "circumstances 
of publication" are that Defendants libeled the Pratts by name, and then used the press 
conference further to verbally disparage the defendants in the Mary Ann lawsuit which 
included the Pratts. Defendants and their audience repeatedly referred to Mary Ann's 
Complaint, making a direct connection between the extra-judicial publication of the 
Complaint and the verbal statements at the press conference. Defendants' identification 
of the Pratts by name in their Complaint, and their subsequent verbal references to that 
document, would justify a jury in finding the exception stated in section 564A(b). 6 
The policy behind the "group defamation" rule is to implement the requirement that 
a person claiming defamation be able to show an injury. The policy is not, as Defendants 
contend, to bar lawsuits by large numbers of defamed individuals. Such a policy would 
run directly afoul of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which provides, "All 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
6
 For the same reasons, Defendants' publication of matters constituting an invasion of 
privacy also state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
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denial ..." A court-made rule that the more people injured, the less right they have to sue, 
would violate this "open courts" provision unique to Utah's Constitution. See Brady v. 
Ottawav Newspapers, Inc.. 84 A.D.2d 226, 234-235, 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, (N.Y. App. 
1981) and pages 31-33 of the Brief of Appellants and cases cited therein, which debunk 
Defendants' argument. The Brady Court's analysis, quoted at page 32 of the Pratts' Brief 
of Appellants, is sound authority for the proposition that the "open courts"provision of 
Utah's constitution precludes a rule stating that Utah's courts shall be open to two people 
who suffered an injury but shall be closed to the same two people if two hundred others 
have also suffered the same injury. 
Defendants' "what if" scenarios are readily answered. If a person merely holds up 
a telephone directory and says "all lawyers are shysters," his statement is not actionable. 
But if he opens the same book and, reading lawyers' names from it, falsely says, "David 
Aagard assaulted me. Richard Aaron assaulted me. Charles Abbot, Douglas Adair, and 
John Adams assaulted me," and continues on in that vein, identifying people by name and 
saying each one assaulted him, each one so named has been defamed, not as a group but 
as an individual. Each person so named has a cause of action, whether the actor calls out 
three names or three hundred. 
This Court's task is, not to rule on a myriad "what ifs," but to decide the case 
before it. Defendants provided the press conference attendees with the Mary Ann 
Complaint, which makes specific statements about the Pratts, and then made verbal 
publications in a way showing the verbal statements referred to each individual defendant 
including the Pratts. This case fits within the Fenstermaker I holding that it is a question 
for the jury whether Defendants' words have a personal application to the Pratts. Even the 
Trial Court recognized this fact in its Ruling [R 245] when it admitted, "Our high court, 
however, also stated that where the words refer only to a class of individuals, yet can be 
interpreted as referring to an individual or limited individuals, that person or those persons 
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can maintain an action for liable. This would seem to indicate a factual issue, improper 
for the Court to decide at this point." 
Defendants' argument that the Pratts' claims were not dismissed, but were decided 
on summary judgment, is frivolous. The Pratts's claims should not have been dismissed 
if they could prove any set of facts in support of their claims. See Point I supra; Bergener 
v. DravoCorp., 740 P.2d 818, 819 (UT 1987). The Pratts can prove that the actual facts 
are as stated in their hypothetical. That proof satisfies the "of and concerning" element 
required for proof of defamation claims. 
In their Brief of Appellants, the Pratts described hypothetical facts that, if proven, 
would negate Defendants' "group defamation" argument. Defendants complain that the 
Pratts used their hypothetical to describe the actual facts of this case, in other words that 
the hypothetical is the reality, and so strikes too close to home. That is a reason for giving 
more credence, not less, to the hypothetical. 7 
Defendants' lengthy argument about the word "particular" is perplexing. 
Defendants cite no cases that even mention, yet alone apply and follow, their analysis. 
The Pratts believe that is because no reported decision has trodden Defendants' twisted 
7
 It is now Defendants' turn to ask this Court to read the transcript of their press 
conference. The Pratts do not object to the Court considering the transcript in its entirety. 
Among other things, the transcript indicates William Mark may have committed perjury and 
John Morris may suborned perjury, by submitting the Affidavit of William Mark to the trial 
court which falsely testified as to what was said at the press conference, and in doing so 
would have violated Rule 3.3 and 3.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, a matter 
within this Court's purview to address sua sponte, separately and apart from this appeal. 
Should this Court deign to consider the transcript on appeal as Defendants now urge, 
it would in effect sua sponte be overturning the Court Appeals' denial of the Pratt's Motion 
to Supplement Record. In such an event, the Pratts ask the Court also to consider pages 8 
and 13-15 of their Reply Brief of Appellants to the Court of Appeals, which includes an 
additional fact not then available to the trial court, that Mary Ann's attorneys have published 
her Complaint on McKay, Burton & Thurman's website. As of this writing, that publication 
still exists and remains a continuing defamation. 
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path of logic. The examples in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §564A itself certainly 
do not, nor do any of the cases cited by any party in this appeal. 
The "group defamation" rule applies only to groups, not to defamations of specific 
people identified by name, however many people are so defamed. That is the lesson of 
Lynch v. Standard Pub. Co., 170 P. 770, 773 (Utah 1918) where the Court states, 
"[Wjhere words defamatory in their character seem to apply to a particular class of 
individuals, and are not specifically defamatory of any particular member of the class, an 
action can be maintained by any individual of the class who may be able to show the words 
referred to himself." If as here a person cherry-picks the names of 265 specific individuals 
from a group of over 1,000 unidentified souls, and compiles the names of the 265 in a 
typed list, and defames the individuals named in the list, he has defamed 265 individuals, 
not a group where no particular person is identified, so the "group defamation" rule, 
whatever its scope, does not apply. 
Defendants would have this Court adopt a recipe for abuse as the law of this state. 
All a person would need to do to commit defamation with impunity is to defame the person 
he wants to injure, then go on and defame a few score other innocents as well. He could 
further shield himself by putting his defamation in writing and attaching it to a Complaint. 
He wouldn't even have to serve the Complaint, just file it with the court clerk. After 
publishing his defamation outside of court he could voluntarily dismiss his action. 
This Court should exercise great restraint in adopting such a rule that flies in the 
face of Article I, Section 11 of Utah's Constitution, and should await a far more 
compelling case than this one, before concluding that public policy and necessity require 
such a broad infringement of people's rights to be protected in their reputations. 
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CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the above, Nevin Pratt and Denise Pratt respectfully ask this Court to 
reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reverse the trial court's August 17, 2004 
Rulings on Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum, Ruling 
on Plaintiff Pratts' Motion to Strike Defendants' "Judicial Privilege" Argument, and 
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, hold that Defendants' press 
conference was not protected by judicial proceeding privilege, hold the Pratts' claims are 
not barred by the so-called group defamation rule, and remand this action for trial. 
DATED July 11, 2006. 
"y-zt-^xLe-
Nevin and Denise Pratt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on July 11, 2006 copies of the above were served by first class mail to: 
John Dustin Morris 
McKay, Burton & Thurman, P.C. 
170 South Main, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Douglas F. White 
3282 Sunset Hollow Drive 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
William A. Mark 
William A. Mark, P.C. 
1010 North 500 East, Suite 100 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
2273 Pratt Nevin-p 107 reply brief of appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
SURVEY OF TYPICAL UTAH CASES FINDING INVITED ERROR 
Assertions of Errors in Jury Panel 
State v. Lee, 
2006 UT 5, 128 P.3d 1179 
State v. Winfield, 
2006 UT 4, 128 P.3d 1171 
State v. McCloud, 
2005 UT App 466, 126 P.3d 775 
State v. Bryant, 
965 P.2d 539 (UT App 1998) 
State v. Day, 
815P.2d 1345 (UT App 1991) 
State v. Smith, 
776 P.2d 929 (UT App 1989) 
State v. Curtis, 
551 P.2d 1257 (UT 1976) 
Defendant assented to composition of jury. 
Defendant assented to composition of jury. 
Defendant did not object to voir dire. 
Defendant consciously refrained from objecting to a 
juror. 
Defendant knew of but failed to object to contact 
between a juror and a witness. 
Defendant refused to move for a mistrial based on a 
juror receiving a threatening phone call. 
Defendant concealed fact that a juror had been his 
job supervisor. 
Assertions of Errors in Instructing Jury 
State v. Malaga, 
2006 UT App 103 
State v. Pinder, 
2005 UT 15, 114 P.3d 551 
State v. Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 16, 86 P.3d 742 
Paulos v. Covenant Transport, 
Inc., 86 P.3d 752 
State v. Bradley, 
2002 UT App 348, 57 P.3d 1139 
State v. Chaney, 
1999 UT App 309, 989 P.2d 
Cheves v. Williams, 
1999 UT 86, 993 P.2d 191 
State v. Kiriluk, 
1999 UT App 30, 975 P.2d 469 
State v. Anderson, 
929 P.2d 1107 (UT 1996) 
State v. Blubaugh, 
904 P.2d 688 (UT App 1995) 
State v. Stevenson, 
884 P.2d 1287 (UT App 1994) 
State v. Perdue, 
813P.2d 1201 (UT App 1991) 
State v. Medina, 
738P.2d 1021 (UT 1987) 
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction. 
Defendant stipulated to a jury instruction. 
Defendant submitted a jury instruction. 
Plaintiff submitted jury instructions. 
Defendant failed to submit a jury instruction 1 
requested by the court. 
Defendant rejected the trial court's correct 
proposed jury instruction. 
Defendant did not request a jury instruction. 
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction or 
request a curing instruction. 
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction. 
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction. 
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction. 
Defendant submitted a jury instruction. 1 
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction. 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 
272 P.2d 185 (UT 1954) 
State v. Thompson, 
170 P.2d 153 (UT 1946) 
Nelson v. Lott, 
17 P.2d 272 (UT 1932) 
Defendant submitted a jury instruction. 1 
Defendant submitted a jury instruction. 1 
Defendant submitted a jury instruction. 
Assertions of Errors in Admitting Evidence 1 
State v. Halls, 
2006 UT App 142 
Salt Lake Citv v. Williams, 
12005 UT App 493, 128 P.3d 47 
Chang v. Soldier Summit 
Develop., 
2003 UT App 415, 82 P.3d 203 
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
2003 UT 51, 82P.3d 1076 
State v. Dominguez, 
2003 UT App 158, 72 P.3d 127 
State v. Bloomfield, 
2003 UT App 3, 63 P.3d 110 
State v. Betha, 
957 P.2d 611 (UT App 1998) 
State v. Layman, 
953 P.2d 782 (UT App 1998) 
State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201 (UT 1993) 
State v. Taylor, 
818 P.2d 561 (UT App 1991) 
IStubbs v. Hemmert, 
567 P.2d 168 (UT 1977) 
Meier v. Christensen, 
1389 P.2d 734 (UT 1964) 
London Guar. & Ace. Co. v. |Frazee, 185 P.2d 284 (UT 1947) 
Defendant stipulated to a fact. 1 
Defendant offered the evidence he objected to on 
appeal. 
Plaintiff declined court's offers to make corrections 
to an accounting. 
Plaintiff provided information to jury without 1 
supporting evidence. 
Defendant elicited the testimony he complained of 
on appeal. 
Defendant did not object to admission of videotape, 
and examined a witness on its contents. 
Defendant successfully restricted evidence of nature 
of prior conviction. 
Defendant stipulated to admission of expert report 
without foundational evidence. 
Defendant moved to exclude evidence without 1 
informing judge of controlling law. 
Defendant failed to ask court to mask inadmissible 
parts of deposition transcript. 
Plaintiff introduced evidence to which he 1 
complained of on appeal. 
Plaintiff encouraged judge to comment on the 
evidence during its presentation to jury. 
Defendant called a witness, could not then object to 
witness's competency. 
1 Other Assertions of Error 
1 State v. Samora, 
2002 UT 384, 59 P.3d 604 
State v. Brown, 
948 P.2d 337 (UT 1997) 
State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546 (UT 1987) 
Howard v. Howard, |601 P.2d 931 (UT 1979) 
Defendant raised issue of restitution and agreed it 
was owing. 
Defendant chose not to object to prosecutor's 
improper closing argument. 
Defendant made improper closing argument and 
failed to object to prosecutor's response. 
Motion - Plaintiff drafted findings of fact omitting a 
fact, then objected to omission on appeal. 
